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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
report numerous instances of youths being intermixed in penal
institutions with hardened criminals.10
By limiting the power of the court to commit a youth to even
a state training school and requiring it instead to sentence the
youth for an indeterminate period1 to an integrated and unified
administrative body such as the commission with the facilities12
and personnel 3 necessary for effective solution of the peculiar
problems of youth, the act gives full effect to the more modern
theory with its goal of rehabilitation, correction and reform
by substituting for mass punishment individualized treatment
and scientific methods of examination.- The Youth Conserva-
tion Act is, therefore, an attempt to find the most effective
method of ultimately rehabilitating and reforming the crim-
inally inclined youth as an individual and, thereby, to return to
society, as useful, law-abiding citizens, youthful offenders as
a whole. RICHARD C. WARMANN
EVIDENCF-MEMORANDA TO AID RECOLLECTION-ADMISSIBLE
EITHER AS PAST RECOLLECTION RECORDED OR AS PRESENT RECOL-
LECTION REvIVED.-In an appeal from a decision of the United
States District Court affirming the conviction of one Riccardi of
feloniously having transported or having caused to be trans-
ported stolen property in interstate commerce, the United States
Court of Appeals, in United States v. Riccardi, affirmed the judg-
ment of the District Court, holding that there was no abuse of
discretion by the trial court in determining that a writing may
be used by an owner as an aid to memory in reviving a present
recollection enumerating a numerous list of household articles,
as well as by an antique dealer, qualified as an expert, to revive
his present recollection that he might give his opinion as to the
value of the chattels based on his prior knowledge of them.
The defendant, Riccardi, transported in a truck and station
10. See 28 MINN. L. REV. 300 (1944).
11. Bennett, Indeterminate Control of Offenders: Realistic and Protec-
tive, 9 LAw & CONTEmP. PRoB. 617 (1942).
12. Ellington, Youth Correction: Institutional Facilities for Treatment,
9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROs. 667 (1942).
13. Ellis, Youth Correction: Personnel Considerations Relating to the
Authority Plan, 9 LAW & CONTEMP'. PROS. 704 (1942).
14. Healy, Youth Correction: Principles of Diagnosis, Treatment, and
Prognosis, 9 LAw & CONTMIP. PROB. 681 (1942).
1. 174 F. 2d 883 (3d Cir. 1949).
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wagon certain chattels of quality and distinction of a value of
$5,000 or more consisting of bric-a-brac, linen, silverware, and
household goods from the home of Doris Farid in New Jersey to
the State of Arizona. Doris Farid, the owner of the chattels,
who had helped pack them, made an inventory in longhand of
the chattels as they were moved from the house and loaded on
the vehicles. Later, she transcribed the inventory on her type-
writer; only one page of the original longhand notes was avail-
able at time of trial, the others having been mislaid.
The government used Doris Farid as a witness to establish the
identity of the specific chattels loaded on the vehicles as being'
those listed in the indictment. To establish the value of the chat-
tels, the government relied upon the testimony of Leo Berlow, a
qualified expert dealing in antiques, who testified that he knew
and had had numerous business transactions with Doris Farid,
and that he was acquainted with the chattels involved, even to
knowing their exact location in the Farid home.
Both witnesses used the typewritten notes made by Doris
Farid and the list contained in the indictment to revive their
present recollection. It was the propriety of the method used to
identify and value the chattels involved and more especially the
actual function of the lists to the two witnesses, that was ob-
jected to by the defendant. The character and nature of the
crime was not at issue since the defendant admitted receiving
some of Doris Farid's chattels but denied the quantity and qual-
ity alleged.
Aside from the matter of the discretionary power of the trial
judge in admitting rebuttal evidence, which was a minor consid-
eration in the appeal and is not treated in this comment, the Ric-
cardi case merits attention for its comprehensive treatment of
the problem arising from the use of a writing for the purpose of
refreshing the recollection of a witness.
In the opening paragraphs of the decision, Judge Kalodner
immediately spotlights the problem in the case by reference to
Professor Wigmore's observation that much of the confusion in
the cases results from the failure to distinguish between what he
broadly terms past recollections recorded and present recollec-
tions revived and the use of the phrase, "refreshing the recollec-
tion," for both classes of testimony.2 Professor Wigmore credits
2. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 755 (3d ed. 1940).
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an Irish judge with first calling attention to the impropriety of
this language.3 That this distinction continues to be overlooked
and enters litigation in one form or another is clearly shown in
the Riccardi case. Here, without use of Professor Wigmore's
terminology, the position of the defendant, resolved from his ob-
jections, amounts to a classification of the writing involved as a
past recollection recorded and the contention that it is not ad-
missible as such for want of the requisite characteristics of that
category; the position of the prosecution is that the testimony
falls under the category of a present recollection revived with
the consequence that the absence of those characteristics which
the defendant would require is immaterial, since the evidence as
a present recollection revived is the recollection of the witness
and not the writing itself.4
Thus, the failure to make the distinction pointed out by Pro-
fessor Wigmore gives rise to the problem in the Riccardi case
and places in issue the function of the writing to the two wit-
nesses. Whether or not the proponent of the testimony makes
the distinction by precise language and discriminating founda-
tion and qualification of the witness, the testimony is necessarily
within one or the other of the two categories and the discretion-
ary power and technique of the trial judge in admitting the tes-
timony should embrace that distinction, if error is to be avoided.
The Distinction Between the Two Categories
As pointed out in the Riccardi case, "present recollection re-
vived and past recollection recorded are clearest in their ex-
tremes, but they are, in practice, converging rather than paral-
lel lines; the difference is frequently one of degree."5 It therefore
follows that the determination of the function of the writing to
the witness is frequently difficult for it amounts to an analysis of
the mental processes of the witness. Are the characters or words
seen by the eye merely transmitted by words to the ears of the
jury? Does the mental process of the witness amount to a repre-
sentation that what he sees, he knows to have once been his
knowledge of the facts recorded, and that his present testimony
offers those facts as verbally transmitted upon the warranty of
his present knowledge and identification of the writing? Is his
3. Hayes, J., in Lord Talbot v. Cusack, 17 Ir.C.L.R. 213 (1864).
4. 3 WIGMORE, EVMDENCE § 758 (3d ed. 1940).
5. 174 F.2d 883,889 (3d Cir. 1949).
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testimony a past recollection recorded as termed by Professor
Wigmore?
On the other hand, the classification of the testimony as a
present recollection revived results from an affirmative answer
to the query, does the witness have a present and conscious recol-
lection of specific facts when his memory is stimulated by the
writing, or other stimulus which he sees or experiences? Is the
recollection independent of the writing itself ? This mental reac-
tion is best illustrated by a writing, the contents of which are
foreign or extraneous to the recollection revived. To another,
the writing would be unintelligible and unrelated to the facts un-
der investigation, but to the witness, by some mental association,
the writing revives an independent recollection of the facts of
his testimony. The nature of the stimulus may be varied. As
suggested in the instant case, it could be an odor, a photograph,
a button or "even a past statement known to be false."T "The es-
sential fact is that, after looking at it, he has a present memory
of the facts."'
The classic and often quoted phrase of Judge Ellenborough is
the foundation of the distinction and as satisfactory a statement
of a present recollection revived as any:
If upon looking at any document he can so far refresh his
memory as to recollect a circumstance, it is sufficient; and it
makes no difference that the memorandum is not written by
himself, for it is not the memorandum that is the evidence
but the recollection of the witness.9
The Distinction Recognized in the Federal Cases
While the distinction is explicit in the Riccardi case, and in the
federal cases generally, it is not uncommon to find that the error
assigned on appeal is a challenge of the classification made by
6. "The situation is one in which the witness is devoid of a present
recollection, and therefore desires to use a past recollection. This he
proposes to do by employing some record of this past recollection and
adopting it as his present statement. . . . The chief difficulties here to
be met have no direct dependence on the principle of Recollection. It must
appear that the witness had a good recollection when it was recorded, but
that is all that is required by the canons of Recollection. It is as to the
nature of the record and the means of making it now available that
certain restrictions must be applied, and this is a matter of the accuracy
and identity of the record." 3 WIGMORX, EVIDENCE 64 (3d ed. 1940).
7. United States v. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964,967 (2d Cir. 1947).
8. Eberson v. Continental Inv. Co., 130 Mo. App. 296, 308 S.W. 62, 67(1908).
9. Ellenborough, L.C.J., in Henry v. Lee, 2 Chitty 124, 125 (1810).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss1/19
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the trial court. In the federal case of Olmstead et al. v. United
States,0 the classification of the testimony of a prohibition agent
as a present recollection revived was challenged. In this case two
agents of the government testified as to the conversation they
had heard over a tapped telephone wire. They listened alterna-
tively, made longhand notes, and at the end of the day carefully
edited the typewritten transcription made by a third party. The
witness testified using the transcription as a reference, the long-
hand notes having been destroyed. The witness stated that he
had an independent recollection of the conversation heard over
the telephone. Professor Wigmore was cited to the effect that
the memorandum need not be an original nor need it be made by
the witness himself.V " In addition several federal cases were
cited concerning other characteristics of a writing'and their im-
materiality to this classification of memorandum.12
McClendon v. United States13 is another federal case with sim-
ilar facts. In that case objection was made to admitting the tes-
timony of a postal inspector who was permitted to refer to notes
which he made at the time of his investigation of the case, for
the purpose of refreshing his memory., The court held this was
clearly admissible.
The Distinction Recognized in the Missouri Cases
The Missouri cases indicate a clear comprehension of the
problem and a recognition of the distinction, although the lan-
guage in a single case is not always convincing. Hoffman v.
Kansas City Laundry Service Co.0 4 was an action by a husband
against a laundry for failure to return goods delivered to its
agent. The court held that it was not error to permit the wife
who delivered the goods to the agent of the laundry, in testify-
fying, to use a duplicate list of the articles on which she had
written their value. While the language of the decision is not
such that it is obvious that the memorandum was admitted as a
10. 19 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1927).
11. 3 WIGMORE, EViDENcE §§ 759-760 (3d ed. 1940).
12. Goodfriend v. United States, 294 F. 148 (9th Cir. 1923) (memo-
randum may be made by another); Grunberg v. United States, 145 F. 81(1st Cir. 1906) (writing made soon after transaction is satisfactory);
Pacific Coast S.S. Co. v. Bancroft-Whitney Co., 94 F. 180 (9th Cir. 1899)(witness can use writing, although not made by himself, if he saw it
while facts therein stated were fresh in his recollection, and he knew the
memorandum, as then made, was correct).
13. 229 F. 523 (8th Cir. 1916).
14. 243 S.W. 232 (Mo. App. 1922).
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present recollection revived, reference to the cases cited by the
court clearly indicates that the precendents relied upon so held,
thus clarifying the decision of the case.'15
The function of the trial court in crystallizing the analysis of
the use of the writing made by the witness is clearly shown in
Lake Superior Co. v. Huttig Lead & Zinc Co.'- In this case a
witness testified as to ore prices during a specified period. He
referred to a memorandum to refresh his memory relative to a
general market decline, then followed this with an independent
present recollection of specific prices in great detail. Prior to a
ruling on the objection made to this testimony, the court admon-
ished the witness to answer "if he knew" and, upon an affirma-
tive answer, ruled that the testimony was not objectionable as
not being the best evidence.
In a 1916 Missouri case,17 a witness identified the number,
character, and value of certain tools and household goods by use
of a twelve page list fastened to his petition, four years inter-
vening between the time of the levy and when he testified. Al-
though he testified that he had made a list of the goods and given
it to a Judge Hays, no evidence was offered by him or otherwise
shown, bearing upon any relation between his alleged original
list and the list there testified from, nor did he have an inde-
pendent recollection without use of the latter list. The evidence
was properly excluded since it was admissible neither as a past
recollection recorded nor as a present recollection revived. The
court said:
It is apparent that his only ground for testifying... is
the fact that he saw listed on the paper before him certain
articles and values stated. He had no refreshed memory,
nor did the evidence characterize the list as one having been
made by the witness or by some one for him with which he
was familiar at a time when the items were fresh in his
mind. Thus neither of the conditions existed which must be
established before a witness may use a list and testify to
facts showing that the paper before him is a correct record
made at a time when his memory was fresh.18
15. Lumber Co. v. Ware, 150 Mo. App. 61, 130 S.W. 822 (1910); Rose
v. Rubeling, 24 Mo. App. 369 (1887); Traber v. Hicks, 130 Mo. 180, 32
S.W. 1145 (1895) ; State ex rel. and to Use Macke v. Randolph et al., 186
S.W. 590 (Mo. App. 1916).
16. 305 Mo. 130, 264 S.W. 396 (1924).
17. State ex rel. and to Use Macke v. Randolph et al., 186 S.W. 590
(Mo. App. 1916).
18. Id. at 591.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss1/19
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Thos. Cusack Co. v. Lubrite Refining Co.19 was an action to re-
cover on a written contract for painted advertising display signs
at locations and at prices "as per designs to be mutually agreed
upon." In that case the evidentiary problem presented was the
use by a witness of a statement of an account not made by him-
self in order to refresh his memory as to certain dates and to
testify thereafter as to his independent recollection as to the
location of the sign boards and when they were painted. The
objection that the memorandum used by the witness was the
bookkeeper's statement and did not appear to be made by the
witness himself, was overruled as immaterial as the witness tes-
tified as to his present recollection, independent of the writing.
Another Missouri case, Eberson v. Continental Inv. Co.,"0
broadens the statement of the immaterial nature of the writing
and its origin when used to revive a present independent recol-
lection to substantially that of the Riccardi case. However, in
that case the objection to the testimony was sustained because
the witness testified as to quantities and values, using a list
which had been made by appraisers. The witness did not know
if the list was correct, had not assisted in making it, and did not
examine the merchandise listed nor the extent to which it was
damaged. His testimony was pure hearsay and the court so held,
referring to Wigmore.21
The Distinction Analyzed in the Riccardi Case
The report of the Riccardi case evinces careful preparation by
the prosecution in laying the proper foundation for admission of
the testimony of each of the two witnesses under the desired cat-
egory; this was no doubt facilitated by the unique quality of the
chattels as antiques. The qualification of the witness, Farid, dis-
closed that she was not only the owner of the chattels but was
familiar with them, "that she lived with these things . .. knew
them" in her home, helped pack them, and was present and made
a longhand inventory of them as they were loaded on the ve-
hicles. When the court also questioned her at length as to
whether looking at the list refreshed her recollection, her posi-
tive affirmative answer coupled with an appearance of truth and
trustworthiness upon which reasonable men would not differ,
19. 261 S.W. 727 (Mo. App. 1924).
20. 130 Mo. App. 296, 109 S.W. 62 (1908).
21. 3 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 735-764 (3d ed. 1940).
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warranted the admission of her testimony as a present recollec-
tion revived by the trial court which was affirmed on appeal.
The Riccardi case raises another interesting point, since the
list of chattels was used not only by its author, Doris Farid, but
also by the expert witness, Berlow, who was qualified as being
familiar with the chattels both from his knowledge of them in
the home of the owner as well as from business transactions
with Doris Farid. It is at once clear that upon no basis other
than as a present recollection revived would the lists be admis-
sible for use by the expert, Berlow. No requisite quality of the
list as a past recollection recorded was known to him; neither
did he profess to have such knowledge, nor did the list accord
with his testimony relating to the value of the chattels. The sole
function of the list to him was to disclose the description of indi-
vidual chattels with which he was familiar and concerning
which his testimony was desired as an expert. The disclosure
stimulated an independent recollection of the chattels them-
selves from which he gave his present recollection and appraisal
of their value.
Classification of the testimony of the two witnesses, Farid and
Berlow, as a present recollection revived rendered immaterial
the nature of the writing, when or by whom it was made, as well
as the fact that it was in part an original and in part a trans-
cription.2 2 The Riccardi case not only illustrates this distinction
but also stands for precise legal terminology and a trial tech-
nique that forges the refinement of the offered evidence primar-
ily upon the disclosure of its true nature. It is this disclosure of
the function of the writing to the witness which determines the
basis upon which the testimony is admissible as well as the ex-
tent to which it merits credibility. If the proponent by proper
foundation and qualification of his witness establishes the char-
acter and nature of his offer, then false or non-essential require-
ments with which the opponent seeks to incumber the testimony
may be swept aside, leaving to the jury the questions of weight
and credibility.
Reconciling the Confusing Language in the Cases
Although in a given jurisdiction the distinction between the
two categories may be established by precedent of long standing
22. 3 WIGMORE, EVMENCE §§ 758-761 (3d ed. 1940).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss1/19
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
it is not uncommon to find confusing language in the cases. The
result achieved by the decision may be in accord with a logical
conclusion based upon the distinction, yet the language fre-
quently suggests that, in the case of "present recollections re-
vived," characteristics of the writing may have been considered
which are immaterial to the admission of testimony under that
category. The query is therefore raised as to whether there is
any rational explanation of this language in the cases, and with
respect to such cases in a jurisdiction recognizing the distinc-
tion can this language be reconciled with the precedents of that
jurisdiction?
In Professor Wigmore's treatment of present recollections re-
vived, attention is directed to the controlling importance of the
function of the writing to the witness, by his observation "that
any writing whatever is eligible for use, while, on the other
hand, any writing whatever may, in the circumstances, become
improper."23 As we have seen, once the function of the writing
to the witness is established solely as a stimulus to a present and
independent recollection, then none of the limiting restrictions
applicable to past recollections recorded have any bearing and
the nature of the writing in such a case becomes immaterial. 2'
Although this general statement seems true, Professor Wig-
more has taken many of the same attributive classifications used
in his treatment of past recollections recorded and in sequence
handled each as having no bearing on a present recollection
revived.
Reference to Wigmore, plus familiarity with the same classi-
fications under the general heading of Refreshing the Memory,
no doubt explains the appearance of confusing language in the
cases where testimony has been admitted as a present recollec-
tion revived and the court continues to treat the immateriality
of such further facts as the writing being a duplicate, etc. An-
other possible explanation is the customary practice of a court
to limit the language of a decision to the point decided, rather
than to phrase the decision in broader terms. Thus, if the error
assigned was that it was improper for the witness to use a writ-
ing made by another to refresh his memory, the decision sustain-
23. 3 WIGNORP, EVIDENCE 101 (3d ed. 1940).
24. "Anything may in fact revive a memory: a song, a scent, a photo-
graph, and allusion, even a past statement known to be false." United
States v. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1947).
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ing the admission of the testimony frequently is phrased in
similar language, i. e., that it was not error for a witness to use
a writing made by another to refresh his present and indepen-
dent recollection of the event,2 5 rather than the broader state-
ment that where a writing is used to refresh the present and
independent recollection of the witness, its origin, nature, etc.,
are not material.
In the Riccardi case the position of the defendant is confusing.
However, the primary ground for the appeal seems to amount to
an objection to the classification of the evidence of the two wit-
nesses as a present recollection revived, although the category as
such does not appear to have been recognized. The defendant
cited Putman v. United States28 to support the objection that the
typewritten list made by Farid was not made by the witness at,
or shortly after, the time of the transaction while the facts were
fresh in his memory. In the Putman case the objection made and
sustained was that testimony given by a witness more than four
months after the occurence described was not contemporaneous
for the purpose of refreshing his memory in giving testimony at
a later time. The court in the Riccardi case distinguished this
case because it did not differentiate between past recollection
recorded and present recollection revived and added that so far
as the condition of contemporaneity was concerned, the Putman
decision was no longer controlling. Language used in Hoffman
v. United States27 is cited for authority on this point. Two addi-
tional cases relied upon by the defendant were distinguished;
Jewett v. United States,2 wherein it was held that the witness
had no independent recollection, and Delaney v. United States,29
where the court concluded that the witness did no more than
read from a photostatic copy. With this disposition of the cases
relied upon by the defendant, the court in precise language de-
25. Olmstead et al. v. United States, 19 F.2d 842, 846 (8th Cir. 1927).
26. 162 U.S. 687 (1896).
27. "The law of contemporary writing or entry qualifying it as pri-
mary evidence has no application. The primary evidence here is not the
writing. It was not introduced in evidence. It was not offered. The pri-
mary evidence is the oral statement of a hostile witness. It is not so
important when the statement was made or by whom made if it serves
the purpose to refresh the mind and unfold the truth." Hoffman v. United
States, 87 F.2d 410, 411 (9th Cir. 1937).
28. 15 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1926).
29. 77 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1935).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss1/19
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cided the case free of any ambiguity relating to the basis upon
which the evidence was admissible.
In some of the Missouri cases the language is not as clear as
that used in the Riccardi case or in the Missouri cases previously
referred to in this comment. To reconcile the language used with
the holding in the case, it is necessary to look back of the case
itself to determine the doctrine that was in the mind of the court
in deciding the case. The Missouri case of Shepherd v. People's
Storage & Transfer Co.30 is such a case and covers a situation in
which a witness was permitted to refer to a memorandum made
by herself at the time of delivery of household goods to a ware-
houseman charged with conversion. The list covered some 24
items and was made a year after the conversion. The witness
was permitted to use the list to refresh her memory as to items
and values. The court also felt that before a witness could re-
fresh his memory from a memorandum, he must testify that the
entry was made contemporaneously with the event.
While this case may be distinguished as making no distinction
between past recollections recorded and present recollections re-
vived as was done in Putman v. United States, still from the
reference made to the Missouri cases cited,31 it is a fair inference
that the testimony was admitted as a present recollection re-
vived, in which event it follows from the premise of this com-
ment that the case errs in the requirements of contemporaneity
and accuracy. However, reference to one of the cases cited, i. e.
Lumber Co. v. Ware, supra note 31, discloses dictum which may
be the explanation of this apparently illogical requirement. In
this case the court said:
Ware [the witness] testified as though he knew at sight
every bit of material purchased from the plaintiff and ascer-
tained the dimensions by actual measurement.... If he had
waited so long after the inspection before listing the items
30. Shepperd v. People's Storage & Transfer Co., 243 S.W. 193 (Mo.
App. 1922).
31. Lumber Co. v. Ware, 150 Mo. App. 61, 130 S.W. 822 (1910);
Rose v. Rubeling, 24 Mo. App. 369 (1887); Traber v. Hicks, 310 Mo. 180,
32 S.W. 1145 (1895); State ex rel. and to Use Macke v. Randolph et al.,
186 S.W. 590 (Mo. App. 1916). Note that these same cases are cited,
note 15 supra, in Hoffman v. Kansas City Laundry Service Co., thus indi-
cating that in both of the principal cases the court had in mind the dis-
tinction between "past recollection recorded" and "present recollection
revived" since these cases cited as a common precedent make that dis-
tinction.
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as to render it unlikely he would remember them correctly,
the fact might give force to the objection of the counsel of
the defendant.32
Here it appears that the attribute of contemporaneity, while
discussed with regard to the writing, in reality goes to the
weight and credibility of the memory of the witness and may
become material as to the representation of the witness that he
does have the capacity of a present independent recollection.
That the court in this case was in accord with Professor Wig-
more's distinction and followed the general recognition of that
distinction in the Missouri cases, is further indicated by the fact
that four Missouri cases cited give clear recognition to the dis-
tinction.3 Added strength is given to this view by the further
fact that these same four cases were cited in Hoffman v. Kansas
City Laundry Service Co. decided the same year, 1922, and pre-
viously discussed in this comment.
As pointed out in the Riccardi case, in the long run, the
primary issue is that of credibility, and it is sufficient that the
jury has as sound a basis for weighing the testimony as it would
in any other instance. So, the lapse of time may become an ele-
ment for the jury to consider in evaluating the offer by the wit-
ness of testimony as a present and independent recollection. As
the cases become commentaries, one upon the other, so do orig-
inal concepts become changed and lost, the meaning assigned
wholly different from that intended, the commentator neither
understanding nor understood, until finally the original meaning
is extinguished and the new concept is wholly unrelated to its
reputed ancestor.3 4
Method of Proof Required
The nature of the proof required differs greatly between the
two categories, since one category rests upon the character and
nature of the writing itself and the other upon the mental process
32. Lumber Co. v. Ware, 150 Mo. App. 61, 70, 130 S.W. 822, 824 (1910).
33. See notes 15 and 31 supra.
34. "In discussing the grounds on which these cases were decided, rea-
sons for the judgments are occasionally attributed to the judges which a
careful reading of the decisions shows were never in the mind of the
Court, and at other times the actual ratio decidendi is deliberately ignored
and grounds for the judgment, discoverable only in the imagination of the
learned author, are substituted for it. ... A case is a precedent for the
doctrine on which the judges based their judgment; it is not a precedent
for a doctrine which was not in the minds of the judges." Goodhart,
Three Cases on Possession, 3 CAMB. L. J. 195, 196 (1928).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss1/19
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of the witness in its use. The foundation for the offer of the
testimony under either category rests upon the same basic neces-
sity of showing the function of the writing to the witness and
the proper classification of the testimony rests upon the ability
of the proponent to draw the required distinction to the satis-
faction of the trial judge.
Review of numerous cases, and study of the method of proof
employed therein, suggests that the best proof that offered testi-
mony is a present recollection revived consists in a showing that
the writing does not serve the witness as a past recollection
recorded. Since classification as a present recollection revived
immediately eliminates the materiality of all attributes of the
writing itself, it is advantageous to have the distinction made as
early as possible and the suggested procedure would reveal the
ultimate issue at the outset and by contrast facilitate the classi-
fication.
As a past recollection recorded the test applied to the offered
testimony in determining its admissibility shifts in emphasis
from the witness to the document. The document is open to at-
tack as to its origin, authenticity, and all the other attributes
which must exist for it to be a trustworthy source of facts. The
function of the witness is to establish those attributes as genuine
and the contents of the writing as material, thus qualifying the
contents of the document as admissible by way of the witness.
In the RiccaMdi case, if the testimony of Doris Farid had been
offered on that basis, then the accuracy of the longhand notes,
their loss except one page, the accuracy of the typewritten tran-
scription, and the lapse of time prior to the transcription, all
become material and present difficulties which might not have
been overcome. As already pointed out, the expert, Berlow, could
not have been qualified in this category. In the case of Farid,
admission of her testimony as a past recollection recorded would
depend on the extent to which the proof of surrounding circum-
stance and attending facts warranted the reasonable acceptance
of the list as a reproduction of the original and the further ac-
ceptance of the latter as accurate.
As a present recollection revived the writing loses importance
and the proponent must establish the oral statement of the
witness as the evidence. The interest in testing the character of
the testimony shifts to the mental process of the witness-the
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actual existence of a present recollection, independent of the
writing itself. Proof of the requirements of a past recollection
recorded becomes pointless. The admission of the testimony will
depend on the satisfaction of the trial judge with the representa-
tion of the witness that his recollections are independent of, and
only stimulated by, the writing. The proof must show that once
the mind is given a starting point by reference to the writing, a
train of thought is recalled which then travels alone and inde-
pendent of the datum point.
However, there is at least one occasion when the contents of a
writing may become material as to testimony admitted as a
present recollection revived and that occurs when the writing is
in accord with the testimony of the witness. The following de-
scription of the situation taken from United States v. Rappy is
clear and suggests the problem of proof raised:
When the evoking stimulus is not itself an account of the
relevant occasion, no question of its truth can arise; but
when it is an account of that occasion, its falsity, if raised
by the opposing party, will become a relevant issue if the
witness has declared that the evoked memory accords with
it. This is true because the evoked memory cannot be a
truthful record when it tracks a statement shown to be
false.3 -
In this situation the requirements of a past recollection recorded
would have to be met to the extent, and in the manner, required
to establish the trustworthiness of the memorandum.
The Impartance of the Distinction
In ruling upon the admissibility of evidence under its proper
category in the field here commented on, the function of the
trial court extends further than the mere ruling. The bare fact
of a ruling should raise a presumption, not only that a proper
foundation has been laid for admission under the proper cate-
gory, but also that the proper distinction between the two cate-
gories has been made to the satisfaction of the court, and that a
record has been made to support the ruling of the court. In
effect, it is the rebuttal of this presumption which has occasioned
the confusion in the cases pointed out by Professor Wigmore. It
is also the usual ground upon which is founded the complaint
raised by an exception.
35. United States v. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964, 968 (2d Cir. 1947).
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Where, upon appeal in this situation, an exception has been
sustained, it frequently develops that the testimony was admitted
without the distinction being made and the record does not dis-
close sufficient information for the appellate court to determine
the proper category or pass upon the correctness of the ruling
of the trial court. The only disposition of the appeal is to re-
mand it. Assuming the absence of other error, the requirement
by the trial court that the distinction be made and properly sup-
ported by testimony is decisive and determines the disposition
of the appeal.
In the Riccardi case the prosecution laid the proper foundation
for admitting the testimony of both the witnesses and the trial
court carefully tested that foundation by questioning the witness,
Farid, to assure that her testimony was from a present and
independent recollection. This skillful technique by the trial
court in the Riccardi case illustrates how the function of the
trial court extends further than merely ruling on the admissi-
bility of evidence.
The Use of Leading Questions -An Alternative of
Questionable Value
After affirming the Riccardi case on the ground that the evi-
dence elicited from the two witnesses who used the lists to revive
their present recollection was properly admitted, dictum in the
case suggests the use of leading questions by the proponent "in
lieu of the procedure followed.113  While the trial judge has
rather wide discretionary power, considering the fact that the
two witnesses for the government in the Riccardi case gave
direct testimony and did not surprise their proponent, it would
appear that in most courts such a procedure would not be ac-
ceptable and would encounter strenuous objection by the oppo-
nent.3 7
36. United States v. Riccardi, 174 F.2d 883, 890 (3d Cir. 1949).
37. The recognition by various jurisdictions accorded leading questions
in this situation is not treated in this comment. The proposed Missouri
Evidence Code offers an interesting illustration of the current develop-
ment. In the 1948 draft § 5.06 (Present Recollection of Witness Revived.
Past Recorded Recollection.) no provision is made for the use of leading
questions. A later revision adds the following: "The present recollection
of a witness, subject to the exercise of a reasonable discretion to prevent
abuse or bad faith, may be refreshed and revived also by leading ques-
tions, objects or anything else that reasonably tends to refresh and revive
recollection."
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Professor Wigmore covers a very limited and unusual situa-
tion in which such a procedure would be acceptable.
Where the witness is unable without extraneous aid to re-
vive his memory on the desired point-i. e. where he under-
stands what he is desired to speak about but cannot recollect
what he knows-here his recollection, being exhausted, may
be aided by a question suggesting the answer. The trial
court's discretion must be relied upon to prevent imposi-
tion.3S
In such a situation, before deciding on the use of these dan-
gerous questions, he points out that the elements to be considered
are the risk of losing valuable testimony on the one hand, and
the danger of false suggestions raised by the questions on the
other. Therefore, the alternative suggested in the Riccardi case
would appear to have such limited acceptance that the well
recognized use of a writing to revive an independent recollection
recommends itself to the lawyer as the most reliable procedure
available, and as a dependable procedure when fortified by the
proper foundation in qualifying the witness as to the precise use
served by the writing or other stimulus.
When viewed in light of the possible influence that a writing
may exert on the direction of the memory, as indicated in the
Riccardi decision, this conclusion seems even stronger. The ex-
tent of that influence is a factor going first to admissibility on
any basis, ranging from exclusion as a fabrication to admission
as an aid to revive a present recollection, and then to the weight
accorded it by the trier of the facts.
Conclusion
Where, by proper foundation, the proponent seeks to qualify
the testimony as a present recollection revived, it is not necessary
to establish the reliability of the writing, nor is its reception
dependent upon its truth, unless so improbable that reasonable
men would not differ on its falseness. As Judge Kalodner de-
scribes the situation in the Riccardi case:
the burden to ascertain the state of affairs, as near as may
be, devolves upon the trial judge, who should in the first
instance satisfy himself as to whether the witness testifies
upon a record or from his own recollection. 39
38. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 134 (3d ed. 1940).
39. United States v. Riccardi, 174 F.2d 883, 889 (3d Cir. 1949).
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Once the distinction has been made as to the category in which
the testimony falls and upon which its admission rests, the
extent of the- possible influence of the writing on the course of
the memory and testimony of the witness is not dropped, but
continues and now becomes a factor for the jury to weigh for
credibility and probative value. Here is lodged the final test of
the force and technique of the proponent in qualifying the wit-
ness.
The claim of the witness to an independent recollection as well
as the reliability of his memory is open to attack upon cross-
examination and this extends to asking the witness if he testified
from the memorandum or from memory.40 His determination to
tell the truth can be investigated and any question reasonably
calculated to disclose the actual use to the witness served by the
writing will not be improper.
As the function of the court is to resolve justly the rights of
the litigants by application of the rules of law to the facts as
found by the trier, so is the purpose of the rules of evidence to
exclude incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial testimony and
at the same time to regulate the revelation by the witness of
competent facts germane to the issue in a manner conducive to
the presentation of those facts in their true and most revealing
aspect. Upon proper occasion, this requires a disclosure by the
witness of the manner, method, or mode employed in transmit-
ting his knowledge. Such medium or mental process, or combina-
tion of both, becomes controlling as to the admissibility of the
testimony and is determinative of the requisite trustworthiness
which must be present if the testimony has probative value. The
testimony is first channeled into the stream of competent evi-
dence, then screened for its probable probative value and mate-
riality to the issue before the trier of the facts.
In the. use of an aid to memory, the truth as to its function to,
and employment by, the witness must be disclosed in order that
the trier may properly evaluate its probative value, ranging from
exclusion as a probable fabrication to acceptance for its proba-
tive weight either as a past recollection recorded or a present
recollection revived.
40. "Neither should the defendant be denied the right to cross-examine
the witness as to whether he testified to certain facts from what he saw
in the memorandum and not from his memory of the facts as they oc-
curred." State v. Miller, 234 Mo. 588, 597, 137 S.W. 887, 890 (1911).
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The offerer will best serve his interest by making the distinc-
tion with proper foundation and qualification of his witness. By
requiring that distinction before exercising discretion as to the
admissibility of the offered testimony, the trial court will avoid
the exceptions frequently taken and sustained in the cases. It
follows that such procedure, both by the court and the offerer,
will make a record which upon appeal will seldom disclose
grounds for remanding the case for want of discriminating in-
quiry and supporting facts revealing the use made by the witness
of the aid relied upon to refresh his memory.
WILLIAM E. PARTEE
PERSONAL PROPERTY - RIGHTS OF FINDER vERsus OWNER OF
LOCUS IN Quo - BILLS SECRETED IN HOTEL ROOM
A painter found $760 secreted under a rug in a hotel room.
The find consisted of a number of large-size bills of a type with-
drawn from circulation more than fifteen years before, wrapped
in a new-style $100 bill. The facts do not disclose whether the
painter who was redecorating the room was an employee or an
independent contractor, but the latter would seem the case.
Plaintiff painter apprised the defendants-hotel owners of his
find and upon their representation that they knew the owner and
would restore it to him, he turned the money over to them. A
period of more than two years had elapsed and the defendants
had made no effort to locate the owners. Plaintiff brought suit
to recover the money. The court found the money to have
been abandoned and awarded it to the plaintiff.'
It is submitted that the question as to the rights to personal
property as between the owner of the locus in quo and the finder
should be considered in the light of: 1) Who should hold the
property so that the true owner may most easily recover his
property? and 2) Who should get ultimate title in the event the
true owner is not found within a reasonable time?2
1. Erickson v. Sinykin, 223 Minn. 172, 26 S. W. 2d 172 (1947).
2. In many states this problem has been dealt with by statute. For
example, Mo. REv. STAT. § 15317 (1939) provides: "If any person finds
any money, goods, right in action, or other personal property, or valuable
thing whatever, of the value of ten dollars or more, the owner of which
is unknown, he shall within ten days, make an affidavit before some justice
of the county, stating when and where he found the same, that the owner
is unknown to him, and that he has not secreted, withheld or disposed of
any part thereof." Mo. REV. STAT. § 15320 (1939) provides: "If no owner
appear and prove the money or property within forty days, and the value
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